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"Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the 
next step which must be taken for the protection of the  person, and for 
securing to the individual . . .  the right 'to be let alone."'l 
- Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, 1890 
Associate Professor, Pace Law School. I would like to thank Mandy Tran and 
Paul Babchik for their able research assistance, and Don Doernberg, James Fishman, and 
Gay1 Westerman for their insightful comments. 
1. Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 195 (1890). 
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'You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it."2 
- Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealey, 1999 
"Privacy" doctrine is currently one of the most high profile and 
most vexing areas of the law. Its recent prominence is due a t  least in 
part to the explosion of the Internet over the past decade3 - a new 
wave of "recent inventions and business methods" to rival 
developments in the fields of photography and publishing in the time 
of Warren and Brandeis4 Its vexatious nature is due to the 
inconsistent comparisons that  are sometimes drawn between the 
various flavors of privacy in the public discourse. 
When we speak of privacy in the Internet age, a distinction 
needs to be drawn between what this article will refer to as  
"traditional privacy," the law of whether and to what extent the state 
can intrude in the private sphere of a n  individuals, and "data 
protection" or "information privacy," the regulation of the use of 
personal information about individuals by non-state interests, such as  
corporations.6 Unfortunately, much of the public discourse on the 
2. See Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: 'Get Over ItJ, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 26, 1999, 
http://www.wired.corn/news/politics/O, 1283,17538,OO.html. 
3. See, e.g., Patricia Buckley, Technology Consulting Forum: Electronic Commerce 
in the Digital Economy, ACCOUNTING TODAY, July 26, 1999, available at  1999 WLNR 
5561547. 
4. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, a t  195. 
5. Examples of U.S. Federal legislation in this sphere include: the Privacy Act of 
1974, 5 U.S.C. $ 552 (2000) (regulating the collection, use, and transfer of personal 
information by federal government agencies); the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 
U.S.C. $ 3401 (2000) (limiting access to, and release of, customer financial records by 
financial institutions); the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. $$ 
2510-2522 (2000) (prohibiting interception and disclosure of certain electronic, wire, and 
oral communications); the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. $3 2701-2711 
(2000) (same). Additionally, and importantly, these rights are protected by the First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the jurisprudence interpreting 
them. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (finding First 
Amendment protection for the distribution of anonymous leaftlets); Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding that  "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places" and 
"what [a person] seeks to preserve as  private, even in an area that is accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(invalidating a Connecticut law which prohibited the use of contraceptives as  violative of 
the constitutional "right of privacy"); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (finding that 
an  Alabama law which required the NAACP to produce a list of members' names and 
addresses violated the First Amendment's "freedom of association"). But see, e.g., Whalen 
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (finding that a New York law requiring the recording of 
personal information in connection with prescription drugs was not an  unconstitutional 
exercise of state power). 
6. In the area of information privacy, the federal government has enacted, for 
example: the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 1681 (2000); the Health Insurance 
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subject of information privacy adopts a framework (and a concomitant 
set of expectations) more suitable to traditional privacy: an inviolable 
"right to be let alone" by the state.7 As a number of commentators 
have recognized, the modern incarnation of privacy, rather than 
creating or reinforcing a sacrosanct right against the government, 
actually creates a quasi-property right, where personal data is a 
valuable commodity and access to it  is negotiable.8 
Given the negotiable nature of information privacy, concepts 
from economics in general, and game theory in particular, can be 
useful in framing and explaining the ways in which actors in our 
information privacy "system" actually conduct themselves vis-h-vis 
personal information. Scott McNealey's opinion notwithstanding,g 
individuals in today's society do have some measure of privacy 
protection. The potency of that  protection ebbs and flows, depending 
in part on the strategic choices made by a number of individual and 
institutional actors, including the individual him- or herself. 
This article briefly explores several scenarios in which 
economic actors compete and cooperate in order to capture the value 
in personal information. The focus then shifts to one particular 
scenario: the ongoing interaction between the United States and the 
European Union in attempting to construct data protection regimes 
that serve the philosophies and citizens of each jurisdiction as  well a s  
provide a strategic economic advantage. A game theoretic model is 
presented to explain the course of dealings between the two actors, 
including both unilateral and bilateral actions. Part I ends with a n  
exploration of opportunities for seizing competitive advantage, and for 
fostering cooperative mutual advantage, through government action. 
Several likely equilibrium states are posited, and a single ultimate 
equilibrium is predicted. 
Part  I explores the literature on commodification and 
negotiability of information in order to explain the contextual nature 
of modern privacy and, further, introduces a number of the contexts 
Portability and Accountability Act o f  1996, 42 U.S.C. $ 1320(d) (2000); the Children's 
Online Privacy Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. $ 6501 (2000); and the  Federal Financial 
Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), 15 U.S.C. $ 6801 (2000). 
7. See, e.g., Susan Llewelyn Leach, Privacy Lost With the Touch of a Keystroke?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 10, 2004, at 15; William Safire, Editorial, Medical 
Intrusiveness Puts Privacy Rights on the Ropes, SAN MATE0 COUNTY TIMES (Cal.), Mar. 11, 
2004. 
8. See generally Edward J .  Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the 
Anticommons, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 899 (2003); Jerry Kang & Benedikt Buchner, Privacy in 
Atlantis, 18 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 230 (2004); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in 
Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996). 
9. See Sprenger, supra note 2. 
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and actors among which information interactions take place. Then, 
Part  I1 focuses on a single context and a single pair of actors, the 
United States and European Union. This part describes their 
divergent philosophies regarding data protection, the conflicting 
legislative results that have flowed from those philosophies and the 
attempts a t  "solving" the privacy conflict between these two actors via 
negotiation. 
Part I11 expresses the U.S.-E.U. privacy conflict as  a n  extensive 
form game, explains the history of interaction between the actors in 
terms of such game and assesses the current negotiated "solution." 
Finally, the article concludes with a consideration of the traditional 
game theoretic underpinnings of the alternative outcomes and 
assesses the likely stability of the equilibrium achieved. 
I. NEGOTIABILITY AND CONTEXTUALITY O F  PRIVACY 
A. Commodification and Negotiability of Information 
It  is no secret that for many of the more developed participants 
in the global economy (including the United States), knowledge goods 
or information have supplanted manufactured goods as  the main 
engine of commerce.1° Increasingly, the "commodity production of 
knowledge" is the focus of advanced economies.ll Even in the 
manufacturing sectors, the processing of information about the goods 
sold, and about those who purchase and use them, is as  important as  
the production and shipping of the goods themselves.12 In what has 
been called an  "unprecedented proliferation of records and data," vast 
10. By some estimates, "[als much as  three-quarters of the value of publicly traded 
companies in America comes from intangible assets," leading Federal Reserve Chairman 
Alan Greenspan to deem America's economic output "predominantly conceptual." See 
Kenneth Cukier, A Market for Ideas, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2005, a t  67. 
11. See Paula Baron, Databases and the Commodification of Information, 49 J. 
COPYR. SOC'Y U.S.A. 131 (2001). 
12. One example of this development is the increased research by manufacturers 
into the use of Radio Frequency Ident5cation ("RFID") technology to track the movement 
of consumer goods. A product embedded with an RFID tag can transmit information about 
when i t  leaves the factory, when it leaves the warehouse, when and where it  is purchased 
a t  retail, and, in combination with credit card information collected a t  the point of 
purchase, by whom it is purchased a t  retail. Wal-Mart, the world's largest retailer, is in the 
midst of an  initiative that, by the end of 2006, will require all of its suppliers to use RFID 
technology on products shipped to Wal-Mart and Sam's Club stores. See, e.g., Wal-Mart 
Expands RFID Mandate, RFID JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 2003, available a t  
www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleviewl539/1/1/; Laurie Sullivan, Wal-Mart Outlines RFID 
Expansion Plans, INFO. WK., June 17, 2004, available at  www.informationweek.corn/ 
story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=22100511. 
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fields of information about people and their activities populate large 
and valuable databases.l3 In the modern information economy, even 
navigating ostensibly non-commercial activities may involve perusing 
databases for pertinent (and thus currently valuable) information. So, 
not only do we contribute information to commercial databases every 
time we buy a DVD online or use a frequent shopper card a t  the 
market, we also make use of information stored in databases when we 
search TiVo for the particulars of a favorite program or peruse a bus 
schedule.14 Individuals are both producers and consumers of 
commodity information. 
Although, as  discussed above, personal information has become 
a valuable commodity, its value is not necessarily inherent at its most 
granular level. That is, a single piece of information (such as  a last 
name), or information about a single individual, or even information 
about a single transaction involving a n  individual, may not be 
interesting or valuable in isolation. Personal information is actually 
the building block of a value-added asset, such as the sort of robust 
database of customer profiles and preferences that allows Amazon.com 
to provide "1-Click ordering, Wish Lists, and product 
recommendations for its regular customers.l5 As with other valuable 
assets and their inputs, private actors vie to monetize, trade, and 
capture the value of information assets, including personal 
information. As with bananas or steel, states may seek to benefit from 
the trade in these valuable assets among private actors. 
13. Daniel J .  Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001). 
14. See Baron, supra note 11, at 135 (citing Andrew Oram, The Sap and Syrup of 
the Information Age: Coping with Data Protection Laws, at 1, 
http:Nwww.oreilly.com/-andyolprofessionacollectionlaw.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2002)); 
Solove, supra note 13, at 1394. 
15. Amazon's 1-Click ordering allows t he  user to accelerate the purchase process b y  
storing credit card, billing address, and shipping address information in  a customer profile. 
See Amazon.com, Ordering via 1-Click, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/ 
customer/display.html?nodeId=468480 (last visited Oct. 6 ,  2006). The order can be 
processed with the click of a single on-screen button. Id. Wish  Lists allow users to  store 
their shipping information along with a list o f  gifts that they would like to receive. See 
Amazon.com, Wish  Lists, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/ 
display.html?nodeId=897204 (last visited Oct. 6 ,  2006). The user's friends and family can 
then presumably be directed to amazon.com, where they purchase a desired item, which is 
shipped automatically, using the stored information. Id. Amazon provides i ts  
"Recommendations" service by examining a user's past purchases and past ratings o f  items. 
See Amazon.com, Recommendations, http://www.amazon.com/gplhelplcustomer/ 
display.html?nodeId=13316081 (last visited Oct. 6 ,  2006). By comparing purchasing 
behavior of  other users whose purchase history overlaps with that of the first user, the  
company recommends future items for consideration. Id. 
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Given information's status as  a commodity that can be built 
into a valuable asset, characterizations of information privacy rights 
as  stark and inviolable, especially as  against private actors, seem 
incomplete a t  best. Actors in the marketplace for information assets, 
including individual data subjects, negotiate, sometimes overtly and 
sometimes tacitly, over access to personal information and its 
attendant value. Examples of these negotiations are legion. 
Consumers routinely provide personal financial data to financial 
services companies in exchange for credit, or a t  least a chance a t  
credit (no mortgage applicant seriously expects to receive access to 
hundreds of thousands of dollars without providing reams of such 
personal information). Customers of consumer products companies 
provide their e-mail addresses in exchange for notification of a 
merchant's sales and special offers. Registered users of e-commerce 
sites such as  Amazon.com register as  a prerequisite to the company's 
collecting the type of purchase history data that  makes product 
recommendations possible. Even outside the consumer context, 
individuals often provide personal data regarding previous 
employment (including salary and performance data), in exchange for 
an  opportunity for new employment. 
It  is not the case that all uses of personal data smack of either 
Big Brother or pernicious spam. Many uses are a result of some give 
and take among participants in an information marketplace, who, 
given the structure of the modern economy, might be seen as 
inevitable dealers in information assets.l6 Without some dealing in 
data, search costs would be higher for both merchants and consumers, 
pricing would be less efficient, merchants would have less accurate 
portraits of their customers, and there might even be higher incidence 
of fraud.17 Absent a negotiation over use of personal data, many on- 
line transactions could not occur a t  a11.18 Overall, the marketplace in 
personal information has been said to promote lower costs for 
businesses and for society a s  a whole.lg 
16. See Jay Weiser, Measure of Damages for Violation of Property Rules: Breach of 
Confidentiality, 9 U .  CHI .  L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75,79 (2002). 
17. Id. at 80-81. 
18. On many e-commerce sites, a customer must reveal an e-mail address in  order 
to create a "paper" trail that allows for tracking of  the order and notification of delivery 
date. Although some sites provide for alternative payment information, the bulk of e- 
commerce transactions require use of  a credit card. 
19. Robert W .  Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online 
Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 86-87 (2002). See also id. at 106 (describing how 
information collection and credit reporting facilitate pooling of  loans, increasing creditor 
liquidity and making more funds available to borrowers at lower cost). 
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This notion of negotiability of privacy is not without its 
problems. Imposing a negotiation framework on the privacy question 
implies arms-length dealings where the parties have information 
about, and are constrained by, for example, their respective costs, 
target prices, and reserve prices.20 However, while the "price" of a n  
individual's data may be readily apparent in some situations (in order 
to receive a confirmatiodreceipt, a consumer must provide a n  e-mail 
address), in many other situations it  is far from obvious. The 
consumer may have no idea what price she should charge a merchant 
for her data and thus may have a difficult time receiving true "market 
value."21 
Further, the "negotiation" may often be forced on the 
consumer. Think of the confirmatiodreceipt example given above. 
What if the consumer does not care about receiving a confirmation and 
does not want to hear from the merchant until the product is 
delivered? Requiring a n  e-mail address to complete the transaction 
forces the consumer into the information exchange. Finally, the 
collection of data by companies may impose an  externality on the 
consumer: the company benefits from each collection, but does not 
bear much in the way of cost. Merchants may tend to over-collect 
personal information in many cases.22 According to Daniel Solove, the 
explosion of the use of targeted marketing rather than mass 
marketing has led to data collection that  "extends beyond information 
about the consumer's views of the product to information about the 
consumer herself, often including lifestyle details and even a full-scale 
psychological pr0file."~3 
As a practical matter, the negotiability of privacy will turn on 
issues of power and leverage. Solove uses Kafka's The Trial to 
conceptualize the privacy problem: 
Kafka depicts an  indifferent bureaucracy, where individuals are pawns, not 
knowing what is happening, having no say or ability to exercise meaningful control 
over the process. This lack of control allows the trial to completely take over 
Joseph K.'s life. The Trial captures the sense of helplessness, frustration, and 
vulnerability one experiences when a large bureaucratic organization has control 
over a vast dossier of details about one's life.24 
20. The target price is the price a t  which each side would ideally like to conclude 
the transaction. The seller's reserve price is the minimum price that she will accept, and 
the buyer's reserve price is the maximum price that he will pay. 
21. See Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 19, a t  103. 
22. See id. a t  102. 
23. Solove, supra note 13, a t  1404. 
24. Id. a t  1421. 
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The frustration described by Solove explains the periodic public outcry 
over a particular announced use or misuse of personal information,25 
as well a s  attempts by users of personal information to assuage that  
frustration. An example of such an attempt is the corporate website 
privacy pol i~y.~6 Compounding the control issue is the question of who 
deserves control, or, rather, who deserves to capture the value 
associated with the information? Is  the individual the sole architect of 
the value of the information? Or is the information formed in 
relationships with others and given value through the consolidation 
and categorization functions performed by advertisers and 
marketers?27 Paula Baron characterizes the debate over privacy and 
the use of data a s  being "about the struggle for ownership in pure 
i n f o r m a t i ~ n . " ~ ~  The struggle may also be characterized as  one for the 
25. For example, in 2000, Internet advertising company DoubleClick stirred u p  
controversy, and attracted t h e  scrutiny of the New York  State Attorney General and the 
Federal Trade Commission, when it announced plans to purchase a company called 
Abacus. See Jeri Clausing, U.S. Investigating DoubleClick Over Privacy Concerns, N.Y. 
T I M E S ,  Feb. 16, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com~ibrary/tech/00102/ 
cyber/articles/l7doubleclick.html; Crisis Control @ DoubleClick: FTC, Michigan & NY; 
Stock Takes a Hit, PRIVACY T I M E S ,  Feb. 18, 2000, available at 
http://www.privacytimes.com/Ne~Webstoriesdoubleclickpv223.htm. T h e  acquisition 
would have led t o  the  mingling of  non-personally-identifiable information long collected b y  
DoubleClick, and personally-identifiable information on many of  the  same individuals 
residing i n  Abacus's databases. Clausing, supra. At  the  t ime, Doubleclick's privacy policy 
promised users that  the  company would never merge information it collected in such a way 
as to identify an  individual. Id. Faced with possible action by  the FTC and by  various 
states because o f  the  inconsistency i n  its stated policy and its actions, DoubleClick 
abandoned the  plan t o  merge the data. See Letter from Joel Winston, Acting Associate 
Director, Divison of Financial Practices, Bureau of  Consumer Protection, Federal Trade 
Commission, t o  Christine Varney, Esq., Hogan & Hartson, Attorney for Double-Click, Inc. 
(Jan. 22, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/doubleclick.pdf. In  1997, 
several database companies, including LEXIS-NEXIS, came under fire for providing their 
customers wi th  database access to personal information about individuals, including Social 
Security numbers. See Timothy Burn, Database Companies Agree to Police On-line 
Information on Net Users, T H E  WASH. T I M E S ,  June 11, 1997, at B12. In  response to 
consumer complaints and the  threat of  legislative and regulatory action, LEXIS-NEXIS 
pulled much of  t h e  most sensitive information from its P-Track service. Id. Also i n  1997, 
online portal Yahoo! discontinued its reverse telephone directory, which had allowed users 
to access the  name and address of  an individual by  entering that person's telephone 
number. See, e.g., Yahoo Pulls Phone Search, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 3, 1997, 
http://news.com.com~Yahoo+pulls+phone+searc2100-1023~3-259291.html. T h e  company 
cited e-mail complaints received from users as the reason for abandoning the  service. Id. 
- 
26. Some commentators have criticized such policies as a meaningless exercise. See 
Solove, supra note 13 at  1451 (decrying privacy policies as "self-indulgent, making vague 
promises such as the  fact that  a company will be careful with data; that it will respect 
privacy; that  privacy is i ts  number one concern" and "phrased i n  a vague, self-aggrandizing 
manner t o  make the corporation look good"). 
27. See Daniel J .  Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1113 
(2002). 
28. Baron, supra note 11, at 131. 
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economic/marketing value represented by personal information. As 
discussed further in Sections 1.B and C, the struggle defined by Baron 
is ongoing and contextual, and it is advanced by a potential host of 
players beyond the individual and his bookseller.29 
B. Contextuality of Privacy 
Because neither the negotiability of data privacy, nor the 
marketplace in which individuals negotiate for the value of their 
information, is inherently or entirely good or evil, examinations of 
information privacy rights should not be made in isolation. Rather, 
data privacy rights must be assessed in view of the circumstances 
surrounding the data transaction. Solove emphasizes that  privacy 
should be viewed pragmatically, a s  a contextual and dynamic legal 
phenomenon, rooted in the "concrete, historical, and factual 
circumstances of life."30 Privacy, and information privacy in 
particular, "is not reducible to a single set of neutral conditions that  
apply to all matters we deem private."3l Rather than possessing a 
singular, immutable "universal value" across all contexts, privacy 
rights depend on their particular social context and the relative 
importance of the information practices comprising that  context.s2 
If we are to deal with the privacy issues raised in the modern 
information environment, we must accept the contextual nature of 
privacy rights. If we are to navigate the contextual nature of privacy 
rights, we must recognize the limitations of traditional paradigms for 
analyzing those rights. Using the example of U.S. West, Inc. v. 
Federal Communications Commission, Solove points out that  part of 
the difficulty experienced by courts adjudicating privacy cases is that  
they are conceptualizing issues regarding the modern collection and 
use of personal information by companies as if there is no difference 
between that context and that  of any other privacy problem.33 In  U.S. 
West, the telecommunications carrier used First Amendment grounds 
to challenge FCC rules implementing consumer privacy provisions of 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.34 Using the Central Hudson 
29. See discussion infra Parts 1.B-C. 
30. See Solove, supra note 27, a t  1091. 
31. Id. at  1092. 
32. Id. a t  1093. 
33. Id. a t  1152 (citing 182 F. 3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
34. 47 U.S.C. 3 222, enacted as  part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
restricts use of, disclosure of, and access to Customer Proprietary Network Information, 
stating that: 
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intermediate scrutiny test, the Tenth Circuit held that the FCC's 
restriction on commercial speech did not directly and materially 
advance a substantial state interest.35 In questioning the 
substantiality of the state's interest in protecting privacy, the court 
fell back on familiar and traditional ways of thinking about the harms 
that flow from inadequate privacy protection, specifically, the 
traditional tort paradigm.36 The court was "fixated on a conception of 
privacy that  views its invasion as a discrete harm, . . . where the 
individual is left with specific injuries that can be readily translated 
into damages . . ."37 In a n  information environment where some uses 
of personal information may cause harm, and some may be harm- 
neutral (or even beneficial) to the individual, it is clear that  the old 
paradigms will not fit all modern contexts. 
Even Judge Richard Posner's economic conception of privacy as  
secrecy does not always neatly fit the economic reality of usage of 
personal data in the Information Age.38 Although one way of looking 
a t  privacy is as the right to secrecy, or the right to "conceal 
discreditable facts,"39 facts do not have to be discreditable for the 
individual to have a n  economic interest in concealing them. Selective 
disclosure of facts about oneself may be beneficial to the individual 
even if the facts are neutral. For example, my e-mail address or snail 
mail address are neutral pieces of information without regard to my 
virtue, trustworthiness, or sense of honor. Nevertheless, I might be 
selective about revealing this information to a n  interested party 
[elxcept as  required by law or with the approval of the customer, a 
telecommunications carrier that  receives or obtains customer proprietary 
network information by virtue of its provision of a telecommunications service 
shall only use, disclose, or permit access to individually identifiable customer 
proprietary network information in its provision of (A) the telecommunications 
service from which such information is derived, or (B) services necessary to, or 
used in, the provision of such telecommunications service, including the 
publishing of directories. 
47 U.S.C. 5 222(c)(1) (2000). The statute provides exceptions for, inter alia, billing, fraud 
prevention, and inbound telemarketing and administrative services. See id. 5 222 (d). 
The challenged FCC rules required a n  "opt-in" approach to customer consent, in  which a 
customer's prior express approval would have to be obtained before her information could 
be used for marketing purposes. See U.S. West, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 182 F. 3d 
1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 1999). 
35. U.S. West, Inc., 182 F. 3d a t  1240. 
36. See id. a t  1235 (characterizing a "substantial" state interest in privacy as  one 
where the state protects against infliction of "specific and significant harm on individuals, 
such as undue embarrassment or ridicule, intimidation or harassment, or misappropriation 
of sensitive personal information for the purposes of assuming another's identity"). 
37. Solove, supra note 27, a t  1153. 
38. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40 (6th ed. 2003). 
39. Id; see also Solove, supra note 27, a t  1106. 
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unless I gain some advantage from the revelation. Will I receive 
discount coupons for giving my e-mail address to Old Navy? Will I 
receive advance notice of sales in exchange for allowing Macy's to mail 
me catalogs? If I cease to be interested in Amazon.com's book 
recommendations, can I remove my information from their active 
database a t  some future date? The facts and situations within which 
an  actor within the information system chooses disclosure are varied 
and mutable. A mere pouring of new wine into old bottles will not 
suffice, and updated paradigms of how multiple actors (including 
individuals, companies, agents, administrative bodies, states, and 
supra-national organizations) actually treat personal information 
under various circumstances must be part of any privacy framework. 
I t  is necessary to bear in mind always the "context and contingency" of 
uses of personal information.40 
C. Key Privacy Contexts, Characters, and Contours of Competition 
What then are the contexts with which we should be concerned 
in understanding how the value of information is apportioned in the 
modern privacy landscape? We may define these contexts in terms of 
a cast of characters vying to capture the value of the information, and 
also in terms of the structure of their struggle over that  value. Often, 
the characters are paired in a binary struggle. For our purposes, we 
will consider the following characters, or types of actors within the 
privacy system: Individuals, Legitimate Businesses, Illegitimate 
Businesses, Domestic Governments and Foreign Governments. 
Individuals are just that, individuals who are either the subjects of the 
personal data in question, or interested in using the personal data of 
others. Legitimate Businesses are those businesses with which an 
Individual may have a relationship, or with whom a n  Individual 
would not categorically reject having a relationship in the future. 
Illegitimate Businesses are those who would like to use an 
Individual's data, but whom the Individual would reject as 
inappropriately risky users of that data. A Domestic Government is 
the government of the state where a n  Individual or Business is 
domiciled, and a Foreign Government is the government of any other 
state. 
The first pairing of interest in the competition over the value of 
personal information is that of the Individual vs. the Domestic 
Government. This is the first type of privacy scenario many people 
think about when they think about privacy, especially the 
40. Solove, supra note 27, a t  1127. 
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"traditional" privacy mentioned earlier in this article.41 Although this 
pairing is typically discussed in terms of civil liberties, individual 
rights, or constitutional rights,42 it may also be viewed through a n  
economic lens. In many situations in which a government may seek 
information about a n  individual, the information has value, and each 
actor may be characterized a s  trying to capture or retain the value of 
that information. Think of the example of police surveillance of a 
criminal organization. The identity and movement patterns of the 
boss of the organization would be of great value to the state in seeking 
to prosecute him as  the head of a criminal enterprise and to dismantle 
his gang. Information about meetings and conversations with known 
perpetrators of crimes would similarly be valuable to the state and its 
law-abiding citizenry. The boss and the members of his organization, 
however, derive great value from limiting the disclosure of such 
information. If the information can be kept from the police, the boss 
can continue to lend his acumen to the enterprise, and the 
organization can continue to reap illegal profits. Each side will take 
steps to secure the value of the information for its own "account," 
including use of video and audio surveillance, informants, and 
undercover operatives on one side, and use of code words and 
intermediaries on the other. 
A second pairing of competitors for the value in personal 
information involves a n  Individual versus a Legitimate Business. 
This is the classic case of a company coming into possession of a 
person's information legitimately and seeking to make a marketing 
use of such information. The information may be valuable because it 
allows the marketer to understand the customer better, and leads to 
further sales to a particular Individual. An example of this type of 
value is the value of collecting and keeping purchase history 
information about a customer in order to make purchase 
recommendations to that  same customer in the future. The Business 
also may derive value from the information by combining it with 
information about other customers. This allows the Business to 
recognize macro trends in the purchasing behavior of its entire 
customer base or of relevant segments. The Individual attempts to 
capture or reserve the value of her personal information by 
withholding certain information from the Business or by extracting 
41. See introduction supra pp. 2-3. 
42. Examples of this view are: the right of the Individual not to have his telephone 
conversations monitored andlor recorded, the right not to be compelled by the state to 
reveal political or interest group affiliation, and the right to make certain personal 
decisions, such as  the decision to use contraception, without state scrutiny or interference. 
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some benefit in exchange for the information. In the latter 
circumstance, even though the Individual extracts a benefit, it is often 
the Business that sets the terms of the exchange and makes the offer. 
For example, a Business may give a discount (or ongoing discounts) in 
exchange for an  application for a store credit card or membership 
card. The Individual would also like to retain the value in her 
information by compelling the Business to offer a n  additional benefit 
for each use, for each new use, or for each request for additional 
information. For example, the Individual would like to receive a 
discount for signing up for a credit card, but there is no necessity for 
an  e-mail address to be included in  the information requested on the 
application. In exchange for providing a n  e-mail address, the 
Individual may want some ongoing benefit, such as  periodic "members 
only" sales or previews. 
Of more concern to the Individual is her competition with 
Illegitimate Businesses for the value in her personal information. For 
our purposes, an  Illegitimate Business is one that  may have acquired 
the personal information without the knowledge of the Individual and 
that  the Individual would likely reject a s  a holder or user of her 
information. The classic case of this pairing is unsolicited commercial 
e-mail, or spam. The Illegitimate Business seeks to capture the value 
of the information (often, in the spam context, e-mail addresses) by 
adding it to bulk e-mail mailing lists. With very large bulk e-mail 
lists, the cost of sending each e-mail message is infinitesimal.43 As the 
size of a bulk e-mail list grows, the probability of the Illegitimate 
Business receiving a positive response, and a potential sale, increases. 
Even though response rates to bulk marketing (including bulk mail 
and bulk e-mail) are extremely expansion of the mailing list 
allows the Illegitimate Business to apply its low response percentage 
to a larger base. Meanwhile, the probability that  the Individual wants 
to actually receive a solicitation from a n  Illegitimate Business is also 
extremely 10w.~5 I t  is in the Individual's interest not to have her 
information revealed to the Illegitimate Business a t  all, and she 
"wins" the competition and retains the value of her information when 
the information remains unknown to the Illegitimate Business. She 
43. See Michael A. Fisher, The Right to Spam? Regulating Electronic Junk Mail, 23 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. &ARTS 363, 364 (2000). 
44. By some estimates, bulk mail response rates are as low as 0.6%, and bulk e- 
mail response rates are similarly less than  1%. See Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing 
Privacy, 20 YALE J .  ON REG. 77, 90-91 (2003). 
45. See Fisher, supra note 43, at 365 (describing public complaints regarding spam 
received b y  the  Federal Trade Commission and Securities Exchange Commission, and 
public calls for limits on electronic junk mail). 
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may also score a limited win when she has the ability to spot and 
ignore, or filter out, e-mail messages from the Illegitimate Business, 
minimizing the costs imposed upon her and her e-mail service 
provider by the Illegitimate B u ~ i n e s s . ~ ~  In the United States, the 
Domestic Government has entered this competition on the side of the 
Individual, passing the CAN-SPAM Act in 2003, and requiring, among 
other things, that advertising e-mails be labeled as such, that header 
information and subject lines not be misleading or deceptive, and that  
recipients be given the choice to opt out of receiving future e-mail 
messages from the sender.47 While measures such as CAN-SPAM are 
applicable to those Illegitimate Businesses that are domiciled 
domestically, they provide no aid to the Individual struggling against 
a foreign Illegitimate Business that  is beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Domestic Government.48 
The Individual does not struggle only against organizations or 
companies over the value of her information. Other Individuals seek 
to capture the value of the personal data as  well. Identity theft is a n  
example of this privacy c0ntext.4~ 'The Identity Thief who is able to 
learn the right type of personal information about the data subject 
(name, address, telephone, Social Security number, credit card 
account numbers, etc.) can derive benefits from posing as the Data 
Subject. The Identity Thief can present himself as  a creditworthy 
person with a stable well-paying job, and therefore qualify for a large 
one-time purchase, a consumer credit account, or even a loan. Of 
course, because the Thief is merely posing as a creditworthy 
individual, he does not care about maintaining that creditworthiness. 
He has incentives to default on whatever obligations he "assumes" 
while wearing his new identity. Such inattention to maintaining the 
status of the Data Subject ultimately leads to losses for the Data 
Subject.50 The Data Subject's main options for retaining the value of 
46. The costs of spam are particularly irksome to Individuals, because such costs 
are almost completely externalized by the sender. See Ayres & Funk, supra note 44, a t  
136. The marginal cost to the Illegitimate Business will tend toward zero. Id. 
47. Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN- 
SPAM) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2719 (codified a t  15 U.S.C. $ 7701 (Supp. 
111 2003)). 
48. Generally, only bulk e-mail senders that are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Trade Commission or certain other federal regulators such as the Securities 
Exchange Commission or Federal Communications Commission will have the CAN-SPAM 
Act enforced against them. See 15 U.S.C. 3 7706(b) (Supp. I11 2003). 
49. Identity theft is "the illegal use of someone else's personal information . . . in 
order to obtain money or credit." See Meriam Webster Online Dictionary, Identity Theft, 
http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/identity%2Otheft (last visited Nov. 4, 2006). 
50. The Federal Trade Commission has reported that nearly 10 million Americans 
were victims of identity theft in 2003, resulting in losses of approximately $5 billion. Do 
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her information are being judicious about sharing of the information 
with others and policing her credit reports for evidence that  her 
information has been misappropriated. 
Finally, the competition over the value in an  Individual's 
information (or, more accurately, the information of many 
Individuals), may be played out between two States. Commodification 
of personal data allows such data to be treated like other commodities 
in some ways. Information may become a n  object of the trade strategy 
and goals of a state or multi-state trade alliance. Protection of the 
privacy rights of its citizens, or preservation of the value of that  
information for domestic users, may become part of a government's 
foreign policy. As such, the potential advantage inherent in valuable 
information may cause a State to enact new laws, vigorously enforce 
existing ones, seek to influence the lawmaking of its trading partners, 
reward its friends, and punish its r i ~ a l s . 5 ~  As this article will 
establish in Section 11, information policy can be used to reinforce the 
cohesion of a trade alliance.52 Section I1 explores the relationship 
between two governments, the supranational government of the 
European Union and the national government of the United States, 
with regard to information privacy policy.53 AS with the other contexts 
previously discussed in this Section, the essence of the relationship is 
a contextual and ongoing negotiation and competition over the value 
in the personal information of Individuals.54 
You Know Where Your Identity Is? Personal Data Theft Eludes Easy Remedies, 
KNOWLEDGE@~HARTON, Apr. 20, 2005, http:/knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
index.cfm?fa=printArticle&ID=1176. The  companies that did business wi th  identity 
thieves (by selling them goods and services, and/or extending t hem  credit), lost upwards of 
$47.6 billion on such transactions. Id. 
51. For example, the European Union is viewed by  many as heavily impacting 
commercial regulation beyond i ts  borders, particularly i n  the areas of consumer protection, 
software, and technology, telecommunications, and data privacy. See, e.g., Brandon 
Mitchener, Standard Bearers: Increasingly, Rules of Global Economy Are Set i n  Brussels --- 
To Farmers and Manufacturers, Satisfying EU Regulators Becomes a Crucial Concern --- 
From Corn to S W  'Bull Bars', WALL ST. J . ,  Apr. 23, 2002, at Al. 
52. See discussion infra Part 11. 
53. Id. 
54. See discussion supra Part I. 
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11. THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE STATE VS. 
STATE CONTEXT 
A. Divergent Philosophies 
The United States and the nations of the European Union have 
traditionally held starkly different positions on data privacy, including 
the appropriateness of government regulation of the collection and use 
of personal information by the private sector.55 The essence of these 
differences can be understood by appreciating how each jurisdiction 
might answer two basic questions. First, to what extent is government 
regulation perceived as  a n  effective and desirable way to provide for 
the needs of individuals? Second, to what extent is data privacy (as 
against private actors) considered a fundamental right of individuals? 
The contrasting philosophies of the two jurisdictions56 set the stage for 
the dissimilar privacy approaches and outcomes that  occur in practice. 
Data protection in the European Union countries can be 
characterized as  adhering to a philosophy of a high degree of 
government involvement in the protection of a fundamental right.57 
Stephen Kobrin has described the European approach to privacy as  
"put[ting] the burden of protection on society rather than the 
individual."5* Others have noted that 
[glovernment on the European continent is perceived ... more as the protector of 
individual needs, rather than an entity who interferes with those needs. Europe is 
more comfortable with a socialist approach where government protects an 
individual's liberties, basic needs such as food and shelter, and continuing rights to 
employment.59 
Still others have gone as far as  to call the European privacy model a 
"command and control model with precise rules governing the 
handling of personal in for rna t i~n ."~~  James Whitman mines the 
55. See infra text accompanying notes 58 & 61. 
56. Id. 
57. See Alexander Zinser, The Safe Harbor Solution: Is It An Effective Mechanism 
For International Data Transfers Between The United States And The European Union?, 1 
O m .  J .  L. & TECH 11 (2004), http://www.okjolt.org/articles/2004okjoltrevll.cfm. 
58. Stephen J .  Kobrin, Safe Harbours are Hard to Find: The Trans-Atlantic Data 
Privacy Dispute, Territorial Jurisdiction and Global Governance, 30 REV. INPL STUD. 111, 
116 (2004) (contrasting the European approach with the American approach to privacy, 
which emphasizes individual ownership and control over, and alienability of,  personal 
information). 
59. Carl Felsenfeld, Unnecessary Privacy, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 365, 370 
(2002). 
60. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H .  Koenig, Harmonizing Cybertort Law For 
Europe and America, 5 J .  HIGH TECH. L. 13,60 (2005). 
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European historical and cultural context to declare that  European 
privacy is ultimately most concerned with human dignity, and thus 
"avidly" protects a wide range of types of privacy in many areas of day- 
to-day life.61 The E.U. Data Protection Directive made clear the 
approach expected of its Member States when it declared that  "data- 
processing systems are designed to serve man" and must "respect 
their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy."62 
By contrast, privacy law in the United States is generally 
concerned with upholding privacy rights against the g0vernment.~3 
"At its conceptual core, the American right to privacy still takes much 
the form that i t  took in the eighteenth century: I t  is the right to 
freedom from intrusions by the state, especially in one's own home."G4 
Regarding private actors, the information privacy philosophy of the 
United States, a t  least for most of the nation's history, is most often 
characterized as  a market-based or largely laissez-faire type of 
approach.65 In this view, privacy rights are property-like; they are 
alienable, tradable, and waivable.G6 Such an  approach is consistent 
with Whitman's argument that  American notions of privacy are 
grounded in liberty, rather than dignity.67 The most important thing 
is to protect the individual from state intrusion into the choices she 
61. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus 
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1156-58 (2004) (describing European protection in the areas o f  
"consumer data, credit reporting, workplace privacy, discovery in civil litigation, the 
dissemination of nude images on the Internet, [and] shielding criminal offenders from 
public exposure" (internal citations omitted), and further describing underpinnings of 
European privacy culture in the European Convention on Human Rights). 
62. Council Directive 95/46, pmbl. Q 2, The Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 
31 (EC) [hereinafter Council Directive 95/46]. 
63. Kobrin, supra note 58, at 115; see also Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher 
Can Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1228 (2000) (citing examples from traditional American definitions 
of privacy, such as freedom from government searches, and freedom from government 
interference in individual decision-making). 
64. Whitman, supra note 61, at 1161 (citing Jeffrey Rosen, THE UNWANTED GAZE: 
T H E  DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY I N  AMERICA 5 (2000)). 
65. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Seizing the Initiative on Privacy: Online Industry Presses 
its Case for Self-Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1999, at C1 (describing concerns raised by  
the Federal Trade Commission regarding efficacy of the traditional U.S. self-regulatory 
model of data protection). 
66. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. 
L. REV. 1193, at 1246-49 (1998); Murphy, supra note 8, at 2402. 
67. Whitman, supra note 61, at 1162-64. Whitman describes American anxieties 
about privacy as being concerned with "maintaining a kind of private sovereignty within 
our own walls." Id. at 1162. In his conception of comparative US.-E.U. privacy, "American 
privacy law is a body caught in the gravitational orbit of liberty values, while European 
law is caught i n  the orbit of dignity." Id. at 1163. 
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makes regarding her personal information. Self-regulation by private 
users of personal information is the American ethos, with government 
stepping in  to fill gaps reactively, and narr0wly.6~ Preserving both 
individual autonomy and commercial flexibility has traditionally been 
paramount, and industry has historically been trusted to police itself, 
particularly where such self-policing would support continued growth 
and development of the Internet.69 The Clinton Administration's 
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, one of the early and few 
comprehensive federal government statements on Internet privacy 
issues, enumerated encouragement of self-regulation and government 
restraint as two of its core principles.70 
B. Conflicting Legislative Results 
Not surprisingly, the legislative regimes of the two 
jurisdictions in question evolved in markedly different directions.71 
The laws of the United States regarding data protection have 
justifiably been called a "legal patchwork,"72 "fragmented,"73 a 
"discordant morass,"74 "reactive,"75 "a crazy quilt of piecemeal 
statutes,"76 "sporadic,"77 and "inchoate."78 Although Congress has 
considered a number of bills in this area,l9 there is to date no 
68. See Zinsner, supra note 57, 1 3 (characterizing U.S. policymaking as "reactive," 
and favoring targeted solutions to privacy problems). 
69. See, e.g., Lohr, supra note 65. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
SELF-REGULATION A D PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1999), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/07/privacy99.p Chris J. Hoofnagle, Privacy Self Regulation: A 
Decade of Disappointment (Electronic Privacy Information Center, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 4, 
2005, http://www.epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.html. 
70. See Felsenfeld, supra note 59, at 365-66; A Framework for Global Electronic 
Commerce, The White House (July 1, 1997), http:Nwww.technology.gov/digeconomy/ 
framewrk.htm. 
71. Compare text accompanying notes 72-78 with text accompanying notes 92-97. 
72. See, e.g., Zittrain, supra note 63, at 1229. 
73. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The 
Prospects and Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual 
Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 COLUM. J. E m .  L. 29, 61 (2002). 
74. Stephen J. Davidson & Daniel M.  Bryant, The Right of Privacy: International 
Discord and the Interface with Intellectual Property Law, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 
Nov. 2001, at 1, 1. 
75. See Kobrin, supra note 58, at 117; Zinsner, supra note 57, 7 3 (quoting William 
J .  Long & Marc Peng Quek, Personal Privacy Protection in  a n  Age of Globalization: The 
US-EU Safe Harbor Compromise, 9 J .Em. PUB. PoL'Y 325,332 (2002)). 
76. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 60, at 39. 
77. Kobrin, supra note 58, at 117. 
78. Id. 
79. Recent attempts have included the proposed Personal Data Privacy and 
Protection Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005); the proposed Online Privacy 
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comprehensive federal information privacy statute. Instead, there are 
sector specific laws designed to address specific types and uses of 
personal i n f ~ r m a t i o n . ~ ~  As a matter of national statutory law, the 
United States protects, for example, financial information,81 
information about children,82 health-related information,83 
information contained in credit reports,84 video rental information,85 
and certain information regarding cable television subscribers.86 
Unless a piece of personal information fits within one of the above 
types, it is likely not covered by any specific federal statute. Some 
protection has been provided by the role played by the Federal Trade 
Commission ("FTC") in protecting against unfair trade practices. The 
FTC is authorized to investigate "the organization, business, conduct, 
practices, and management of any person, partnership, or corporation 
engaged in or whose business affects commerce . . . "87 More 
specifically, the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to pursue complaints of 
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce," 
including deceptive practices relating to the collection and use of 
personal data.88 Additionally, protection against certain specific and 
intrusive uses has been provided by recent federal action in the areas 
of SPAM89 and unwanted telemarketing calls.90 By and large, 
however, most of the immense amount of data collected by private 
interests in the United States slips through the statutory cracks.g1 
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 84, 109th Cong. (2005); and the proposed Consumer Privacy 
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1263, 109th Cong. (2005). 
80. See sources cited infra notes 81-86. 
81. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 5  6801-6809 (2000). 
82. See Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. $$ 6501-6506 
(2000). 
83. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
84. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 1681 (2000). 
85. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. 5 2710 (2000). 
86. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. $ 222(c) (2000). 
87. 15 U.S.C. $ 46(a) (2000). Banks, savings & loan institutions, credit unions, and 
common carriers are excepted from this authority. Id. 
88. Id. $ 45(a)(l). 
89. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN- 
SPAM) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2719 (codified a t  15 U.S.C. $ 7701 (Supp. 
I11 2003)). 
90. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule (the Federal "Do-Not-Call'' Registry), 16 CFR § 
310.1-9 (2006). 
91. Some states, notably California, have moved to fill the gaps left by federal 
statutes, but this Article is concerned with statutory action a t  the national level. See 
Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, CAI,. BUS. & PROF. CODE $$ 22575-79 (Deering 
2003). 
Heinonline - -  9 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 19 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 7  
20 VANDERBILT J. OF ENTERTAlNMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 9: 1: 1 
Meanwhile, information privacy protection in the European 
Union has long been the subject of comprehensive legislative action.92 
Beginning in the 1970's, several countries developed national laws 
regulating the processing of data about individuals, including 
collection, use, and storage.93 These laws, although emanating from a 
shared understanding of individual rights, did not provide a uniform 
level of p r o t e ~ t i o n . ~ ~  In an  effort to harmonize the differences among 
- 
national laws and facilitate the free flow of data across intra-Union 
borders, the then-fifteen Member States of the E.U. put into effect 
Directive 951461EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 
("E.U. Directive9').95 The E.U. Directive prescribes specific 
requirements for the handling (or "processing") of personal data, 
defined as  "any information relating to a n  identified or identifiable 
natural person."96 An "identifiable person" (the "data subject" of the 
personal data) is "one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more 
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity."97 
"Processing" of personal data is defined broadly to mean "any 
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, 
whether or not by automatic means, such as  collection, recording, 
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
- 
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or 
destruction."98 The E.U. Directive covers the processing activities of 
both "data controllers" (those who determine the purposes of, and 
means for, p r o c e s ~ i n g ) , ~ ~  and "data processors" (those who actually 
process the data on behalf of a controller).100 The Member States of 
the European Union are required to adopt national laws consistent 
92. See infra notes 93-96. 
93. See European Commission, Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 
h t t p : / / e c . e u r o p a . e u / j u s t i c e _ h o m e / f s j / p ~ n . h t m  (last visited Nov. 
4, 2006) (listing legislation in various countries, including France's 1978 Act on Data 
Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties, and Ireland's Data Protection Act 1988). 
94. See generally statutes listed in id. that preceded Council Directive 95/46/EC. 
95. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 62. 
96. Id. art. 2(a). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. art. 2(b). 
99. Id. art. 2(d). 
100. Id. art. 2(e). 
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with the E.U. Directive.lol Those national laws are required to apply 
where the processing activities of a data controller take place in the 
territory of a Member State, where a Member State's national law 
applies by virtue of international public law, or where a data 
controller makes use of equipment situated within the territory of a 
Member State.102 
The E.U. Directive requires that the laws enacted by Member 
States provide for adherence to certain principles in the processing of 
personal data.103 Personal data must be processed fairly and in  a 
manner consistent with specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, 
maintained accurately, updated periodically, erased or rectified in a 
timely manner, and kept anonymously when identification of data 
subjects is no longer necessary.lo4 Member States must provide in 
their national laws that  personal data may only be processed where: 
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or 
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data 
subject is party or in order to take steps at  the request of the data subject prior to 
entering into a contract; or 
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the 
controller is subject; or 
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data 
subject; or 
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the 
public interest or i n  the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a 
third party to whom the data are disclosed; or 
(0 processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued 
by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, 
except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the data subject which require protection under Article 1(1).lo5 
Certain categories of data receive a n  even higher level of 
protection under the E.U. Directive.106 Data about race, ethnicity, 
political or religious affiliation, health, sex life, or union membership 
may not be processed, subject to an  explicit consent exception, and 
certain other narrow exceptions.lo7 
101. Id. art. 4(1). 
102. Id. 
103. See id. art. 6 .  
104. Id. 
105. Id. art. 7. 
106. See id art. 8. 
107. Id. 
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Data controllers must give notice to data subjects of, among 
other things, their own status as data controllers, the purpose of the 
processing, the identities of the recipients of the data, and the fact 
that the data subject has a right of access and correction.10s The 
access right, provided by Article 12 of the E.U. Directive, requires 
Member States to guarantee that data subjects may obtain from the 
data controller information regarding the processing of the data 
subject's information, including the categories of data being processed, 
the purpose of the processing, the source of the data, and the logic by 
which the data is being processed.109 Article 12 also provides that 
data may be rectified, erased, or blocked if its processing does not 
comply with the provisions of the E.U. Directive.llo Article 14 grants 
further objection rights to the data subject, allowing prohibition of use 
of data where the data subject articulates "compelling legitimate 
grounds," and enabling the data subject to object to the use of his 
personal data for direct marketing purposes.ll1 Data subjects also 
have the right not to be subject to decisions about them that  are 
arrived a t  via automated processing rather than human decision- 
making.112 
Data controllers face additional requirements and constraints 
under the E.U. Directive. Data security measures must provide (or 
require from its data processors) a n  "appropriate" level of protection 
against destruction, loss, unauthorized alteration, or unauthorized 
disclosure.ll3 The appropriateness of security measures is to be 
determined with reference to the state of the art  regarding data 
security.l14 Any processing involving retention of a data processor 
must be governed by contract wherein the processor agrees to act only 
on instructions from the controller, and also assumes the data security 
responsibilities that  bind the controller.115 Generally, the data 
controller must also notify the data protection authority ("DPA") of the 
relevant Member State before carrying out a data processing 
operation that  is automatic in nature, either in whole or in part.116 All 
Member States of the union were required by the E.U. Directive to 
108. Id. art. 10-11. 
109. Id. art. 12(a). 
110. Id. art. 12(c) 
111. Id. art. 14. 
112. Id. art. 15. 
113. Id. art. 17(1). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. art. 17(3). 
116. Id. art. 18(1). 
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enact implementing legislation bringing their national laws into 
harmony with the Directive's requirements by October 1998.117 
C. The Tie That Binds 
The E.U. Directive certainly establishes a comprehensive 
regime, one that  might even seem stifling to a n  individual or company 
used to a more American information privacy ethos. But why exactly 
did the European Union's subjecting itself to a hyper-stringent set of 
data privacy practices gore America's ox? The answer is twofold. 
First, the value of trade between the United States and the European 
Union is enormous. In 2003, the total value of trade with the  fifteen 
nations that made up the European Union when the E.U. Directive 
was adopted was over $400 billion.118 By one estimate, inclusion of 
transactions between affiliates in the trade calculation would bring 
the value of U.S.-E.U. trade to $1.7 trillion.llg As the European Union 
continues to expand, the value of transactions between the two 
jurisdictions can be expected to continue to grow as  we11.120 Much of 
the commercial traffic between the United States and the European 
Union is accompanied by, or consists of, streams of data. Sales of 
goods (for example, the purchase of a pair of customized athletic shoes 
by a French teenager from an  American multinationall21) may involve 
the collection of information from andlor about a customer. Online 
117. Id. art .  32. As of this writing, all Member States had enacted legislation 
seeking to comply with the Directive. See Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 
http://ec.europa.euljustice~home/fsj/privacyaw/implementationen.htm (last visited Oct. 
10, 2006). 
118. See U.S. Census Bureau, Trade with European Union: 2003, 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/cOOll.html#2OO3 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
Total trade for the first five months of 2005 with the 25 nations of the recently expanded 
Union was $202 billion. See U.S. Census Bureau, Trade with European Union: 2005, 
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/cOOO3.html#2OO5 (last visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
119. See Shaffer, supra note 73, a t  30 (citing Transatlantic Governance in Historical 
and Theoretical Perspective, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3,
4 (Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2001)). 
120. The European Union currently consists of 25 Member States: Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See European 
Union Member States, http://europa.eu/abc/governments/index~en.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 
2006). An additional five nations (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey) are currently candidate countries. Id. 
121. See, for example, NikeID.com, Nike's online customization store, 
http://nikeid.nike.com/nikeid/index.jhtml?refww.nike.com#home (last visited Oct. 10, 
2006). 
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purchases of services or technology goods (such as software) similarly 
involve exchanges of information. 
Secondly, the E.U. Directive creates the possibility that  the 
streams of information alluded to above might come to a halt.122 
Article 25 requires the Member States to allow transfers of personal 
data to countries outside of the European Union "only if ... the third 
country in question ensures an  adequate level of protection."123 
"Adequacy" is to be assessed based upon a number of factors, 
including: 
the nature of the data, the  purpose and duration of the proposed processing 
operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, the 
rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force i n  the third country in question and 
the professional rules and security measures which are complied with i n  that 
country.la4 
A finding of inadequacy requires a Member State to take steps 
to prevent transfers to a given third c0untry.1~~ A third country may 
enter into negotiations with the European Commission in order to 
rectify the situation, and may achieve adequacy via its domestic law or 
its international commitments.126 Article 26 provides a number of 
derogations from, or exceptions to, Article 25's prohibition on transfers 
to countries with inadequate privacy pr0tecti0n.l~~ Among these are 
unambiguous consent of the data subject, necessity of the transfer for 
performance or completion of a contract, protection of the vital 
interests of the data subject, and necessity to the public interest.128 
Additionally, a data controller may make certain guarantees 
regarding protection of privacy rights in order to gain approval from a 
Member State's DPA for a particular data transfer or set of 
transfers. 129 
As a practical matter, the derogations do not provide much 
relief for a company located in an  "inadequate" country that wishes to 
import data from a European Union Member State. Obtaining 
unambiguous consent from every data subject that is part of a high 
volume of online transactions can be nearly impossible.130 The 
122. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 62, art. 25(1). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. art. 25(2). 
125. Id. art. 25(4). 
126. Id. art. 25(5)-(6). 
127. Id. art. 26(1). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. art. 26(2). 
130. See Rose Barcelo, Seeking Suitable Options for Importing Data from the 
European Union, 36 INT'L LAW. 985, 995 (2002). 
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European Commission's interpretation of what constitutes a 
"necessary" transfer is extremely narrow and renders the necessity- 
based derogations of little use to most data controllers.l31 The 
practical limitations of Article 26 and the stark prohibitions of Article 
25 have resonance with U.S.-based companies because the United 
States was not a t  the time of the E.U. Directive's adoption, nor is it 
currently, deemed to provide adequate protection to personal data.132 
Without some sort of accommodation on either side, American 
multinationals faced the prospect of not being able to move crucial 
information (including transactional data, marketing profiles, and 
employee records) from the European countries where they were 
collected to the United States divisions in which their value would be 
realized. 
D. A Negotiated Solution 
The prospect of a catastrophic cessation of data flows from 
Europe prompted the United States Department of Commerce to enter 
into bilateral negotiations with the European Commission, with the 
goal of finding a data protection solution that  would pass muster as  
"adequate" by European Union standards without excessively 
burdening U.S.-based multinational~.l3~ The result was Safe Harbor, 
a self-certification program that allows participating U.S. firms to be 
deemed adequate protectors of personal data, a s  far as  the Member 
States of the European Union are concerned. Data transfers from all 
Member States to Safe Harbor companies are allowed to continue 
without prior approval from the DPAs of the Member S t a t e ~ . l 3 ~  
131. See id. a t  996. 
132. To date, the following non-Member States have been declared by the European 
Commission to provide adequate protection to personal data, for purposes of Article 25: 
Switzerland (Commission Decision 2000/518, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 1); Canada (Commission 
Decision 200212, 2001 O.J. (L 2) 13); Argentina (Commission Decision 20031490, 2003 O.J. 
(L 168)); Guernsey (Commission Decision, 20031821, 2003 O.J. (L 308) 27); and the Isle of 
Man (Commission Decision, 2004/411, 2004 O.J. (L 151) 1). See Commission Decisions on 
the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third Countries, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice~homelfsjlprivacylthridcountrieslindex~en.htm (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2006). 
133. See Kobrin, supra note 58, at  113. 
134. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, 
http://export.govlsafeharbor/sh~overview.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2006); see also 
Commission Decision Pursuant to Directive 95146lEC on the Adequacy of Safe Harbor 
Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, http:/lwww.export.gov/safeharbor/DecisionSECGEN-EN.htm (last visited Nov. 
4, 2006) (assuring that additional guarantees are not necessary for Safe Harbor 
companies). 
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Participating companies join Safe Harbor by annually certifying to the 
Department of Commerce that  they are in compliance with seven Safe 
Harbor Principles.l35 They must also state in their published privacy 
statements that they adhere to the p r in~ ip1es . l~~  A firm may achieve 
the promised adherence by "(1) join[ing] a self-regulatory privacy 
program that  adheres to the safe harbor's requirements; or (2) 
develop[ing] its own self regulatory privacy policy that conforms to the 
safe harbor."l37 The Department of Commerce maintains a list of 
companies that have self-certified.138 
The seven Safe Harbor Principles are: Notice, Choice, Onward 
Transfer, Access, Security, Data Integrity, and Enfor~ement.l3~ In 
essence, the principles require that  a firm notify data subjects about 
the purpose for the collection and use of their information and that the 
data subject be able to choose whether the data will be used for any 
other purpose or disclosed to a third party. In order to disclose data to 
a third party (Onward Transfer), the firm must comply with the 
Notice and Choice principles.140 Data subjects must have access to 
their data and be reasonably able to correct, amend, or delete their 
information.141 Firms must take reasonable steps to provide effective 
data security and data integrity, and they must provide procedures 
and mechanisms for handling data subjects' complaints and disputes 
regarding the handling of their data.142 
Participation in Safe Harbor is currently open to organizations 
that are subject to the regulatory authority of the FTC or the United 
States Department of Transportation.143 Both agencies have indicated 
via letters to the European Commission that they will take action 
against Safe Harbor companies who do not meet their obligations 
under the ~ r 0 g r a m . l ~ ~  Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, along with the 
terms of the Safe Harbor program, participants who fail to provide 
adequate protection may be subject to a n  FTC action for engaging in 
135. See Shaffer, supra note 73, a t  62. 
136. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 134. 
137. Id. 
138. The Department of Commerce Safe Harbor list may be found a t  
http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsElwebPages/safe+harbor+list. 
139. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 134. 
140. Id. 
141. See id. 
142. For a more detailed treatment of the Safe Harbor Principles, see id. 
143. Id. This means that companies in certain industries, including much of the 
financial services sector, is unable to participate in  Safe Harbor, and thus have not 
resolved their issues regarding Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive. 
144. See id. 
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"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."l45 A 
delinquent Safe Harbor firm may find itself subject to administrative 
orders, penalties of up to $12,000 per day, and removal from the Safe 
Harbor list.146 
Safe Harbor has received mixed reviews. To some, it 
represents a successful compromise that  may contribute to "a gradual 
convergence in data privacy practices."147 To others, Safe Harbor 
means that both Americans and Europeans find themselves "subject to 
a privacy regime that is not of their making and certainly does not 
reflect their common interests."148 Participation levels have not been 
overwhelming. As of September 2006, approximately 1014 companies 
were current in their certification status with the Safe Harbor 
~ r 0 g r a m . l ~ ~  This represents a fairly small percentage of U.S. 
companies in total. Of the current Safe Harbor companies, only 60 are 
members of the Fortune 500.150 Presumably, companies of that size 
and global reach were the types of companies for whom Safe Harbor 
was designed in the first place. The European Commission has voiced 
disappointment in the number of registered Safe Harbor 
organizations,l51 but has also noted the absence of complaints from 
data subjects as  one indication that those companies that are 
registered are mainly in ~omp1iance . l~~ Of greater concern to the 
European Commission is the fact that  few Safe Harbor companies 
have incorporated the Safe Harbor Principles into their written 
privacy policies to the Commission's satisfaction, and the Commission 
seeks a more proactive compliance effort from the Department of 
145. 15 U.S.C. $ 45(a)(l) (2000). 
146. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 134. 
147. Shaffer, supra note 73, at 66. 
148. See Kobrin, supra note 58, at 128. 
149. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor List, supra note 138. 
150. Compare Fortune 500 2006: Our Annual Ranking of America's Largest. 
Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 17, 2006, at F1-F20, available at 
http:llmoney.cnn.com/magazineslfortunelfortune5OOlfulllistl, with U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Safe Harbor List, supra note 138. 
151. The Commission is even considering analyzing the market share of Safe Harbor 
companies as a way of measuring whether the program is likely having a significant 
impact on data practices. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staf f  
Working Document, The Implementation of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the 
Adequate Protection of Personal Data Provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and 
Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of Commerce, 5, SEC 
(2004) 1323 (Oct. 20, 2004), available at http:llec.europa.euljustice~homelfsjlprivacyl 
docsladequacylsec-2004-1323-en.pdf [hereinafter Implementation of Commission Decision 
520/2000/EC]. 
152. Id. at 6. 
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Commerce and the FTC.153 HOW did the European Union and the 
United States get to the current state of play regarding data privacy, 
and to what extent have they addressed their privacy issues? More 
importantly, where do they go from here in terms of their relationship 
uis-h-uis privacy? Part I11 examines and assesses the interaction of 
the United States and the European Union using concepts from game 
theory and attempts to chart a course for a more satisfactory outcome. 
111. SETTING THE MODEL 
The utility of game theoretic models to analyze problems of law 
and policy is well established.ls4 Scholars have used game theory 
analysis to model competitive behavior with respect to valuable 
intangible assets, such as intellectual property.155 They have also long 
used game theory to better understand and predict the actions of 
states in the areas of international law and international trade.1s6 
The State vs. State context of the data privacy game presents a 
competition among nations to capture or retain the value of intangible 
information and may be modeled separately from either the IP  or the 
international trade games. 
One potentially useful game theory model for examining the 
State vs. State context is the normal form game, a 2x2 
competition/cooperation matrix, the most familiar flavor of which is 
the Prisoner's Dilemma.157 In the normal form game, the players 
move simultaneously, each choosing a strategy without knowledge of 
the course of action chosen by the other player (although each player 
may know a good deal of information about other aspects of their 
153. See id. at 7-8. 
154. See generally Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of 
Competition, 60 U .  CIN.  L. REV. 285, 297-303 (1991) (citing game theory applications i n  
collective bargaining, antitrust, contracts, sales, property law, industrial organizations, 
and agency theory, and relating legal applications of game theory to cross-purposes 
optimization). 
155. See, e.g., David W .  Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Corporation, 60 U .  CIN.  L. REV. 305, 316- 
18 (1991) (modeling foreign direct investment decisions, including technology transfer); 
Ruth L. Okediji, Public Welfare and the Role of the WTO: Reconsidering the TRIPS 
Agreement, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 819, 852-72 (2003) (analyzing negotiation of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, or TRIPS Agreement). 
156. See, e.g., Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A 
Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J .  INT'L L. 143 (2001), Brett 
Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 679 
(2003). 
157. See Shubik, supra note 154, at 288-90. 
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playing environment).158 The players face a binary choice of 
strategies, promising different payoffs for each player depending upon 
which of the two available strategies she chooses, and which of two 
strategies is adopted by her ~o-player. l5~ In a game of complete but 
imperfect information, a common variant, the players know their own 
available strategies and payoffs, a s  well as  the available strategies 
and payoffs of their co-player.l6O As noted above, however, a player 
does not know which strategy her co-player will actually choose.161 
Payoffs are often represented, and will be represented here, a s  dollar 
amounts gained or lost by the players. 
A number of assumptions are necessary in creating the model 
and situating the players therein. The United States faces a choice 
between regulating uses and transfers of personal data or permitting 
such uses and transfers to occur without interference (the choice will 
be represented in the model as  RegulateIDon't Regulate). Regulation 
entails direct dollar costs in the form of creation and maintenance of 
an  administrative and/or judicial apparatus to enforce the regulatory 
regime. The decision to regulate also reduces U.S. revenues from 
commercial uses of personal data. A scheme that regulates data flows 
may lead to certain transactions being halted that  would otherwise be 
completed. Such a scheme may also slow down transactions that  
would otherwise be completed on a timelier basis. Fewer transactions 
may be completed by U.S. firms, and those firms' revenues can be 
expected to decrease over time. Delays in completing those 
transactions that do succeed will also cost the firms revenue. For the 
United States as a player in the game, the decrease in the revenue of 
U.S. firms can be represented as a n  aggregate loss by all U.S. firms, or 
as  a loss of tax revenues for the United States as  a state (such tax 
revenue loss amounting to a percentage of the aggregate loss by the 
firms). 
The European Union faces a choice between permitting data 
use and transfers by foreign firms on a fairly laissez faire basis, or 
restricting such activity (represented in the model as  Allow/Restrict). 
Restriction entails a direct cost, just a s  regulation does for the United 
States. However, we assume the European Union's marginal cost to 
be lower than the United States' cost, due to a more developed pre- 
existing infrastructure for the regulation of commercial transactions, 
158. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 6-7 (1994). 
159. See id. at 8. 
160. Id. at 9-10. 
161. Id. at 10. 
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including data transactions.162 A decision by the European Union to 
Restrict reduces United States revenues, potentially by a larger 
amount than that  caused by a United States decision to Regulate (due 
to, for example, less concern on the part of E.U. regulators for revenue 
effects of their activities on foreign firms than U.S. regulators would 
likely demonstrate for their own domestic firms). If the European 
Union decides to Allow, it faces a number of costs, some of which are 
more quantifiable than others. There will, of course, be political costs 
for a government that is seen as  failing to protect what its 
constituents hold to be a fundamental right. There may even be an  
increase in direct litigation costs, as  citizens either sue E.U. Member 
States for failing to protect their rights or make increased use of 
administrative and judicial apparatuses in enforcing rights against 
private actors (whose data use and transfer activities are likely to 
increase under an  "Allow" regime). 
Even more important from a strategic perspective is the 
question of what costs in the way of lost revenues the European Union 
might incur by deciding to Allow. If the European Union Restricts, 
more transactions that would otherwise have been completed between 
E.U. consumers and U.S. merchants will instead be completed 
between E.U. consumers and E.U. firms. Therefore, by Allowing, the 
European Union creates the possibility for the United States to 
capture more of the value of the personal data of E.U. consumers. 
This value is made up of the raw value of transactions with E.U. 
consumers, plus whatever multiplier effect operates on future 
transactions.163 The value-capture issue forces the European Union, 
when making the Allow/Restrict decision, to consider the global reach 
of U.S. firms, the relatively aggressive marketing culture of U.S. 
business, and the general orientation among U.S. firms toward 
maximizing the use of, and return on, personal data as an  investment 
in the growth of the company. 
In  the model, for convenience, we assume that the value of the 
personal data of E.U. consumers is 100. The United States faces a 
cost to Regulate of 20. The European Union maintains a baseline cost 
of regulation of 10, reflecting a more highly regulated economy in 
general than that of the United States. If the European Union 
chooses to Restrict, it incurs an  additional cost of 10. If the United 
162. See discussion supra Part 1I.A. 
163. For example, maintaining a robust database of customer identifying data, 
preferences, and purchase history may lead to more transactions in the future with 
existing customers than if no such data is kept. Additionally, more new customers may be 
marketed to, and transacted with in the future, if consumer data can be collected and 
transferred to a central marketing department for analysis. 
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States declines to Regulate, while the European Union chooses to 
Allow, the United States captures 70% of the value of the personal 
data, with the European Union capturing 30% (less its baseline 
regulatory costs of 10, for a net payoff of 20). If the United States 
declines to regulate while the European Union Restricts, the United 
States captures 40% of the value, while the European Union receives 
60% (less regulation costs of 10 and costs to Restrict of 10, resulting in 
a net payoff of 40). If the United States Regulates while the European 
Union Allows, each captures half the value of the data, less their 
respective regulation costs (20 in the case of the United States, and 10 
in the case of the European Union). If the United States Regulates 
while the European Union Restricts, the United States earns 30% of 
the value, less regulation costs of 20 (for a payoff of lo), while the 
European Union captures 70% of the value, less baseline regulation 
costs and costs to Restrict (for a net payoff of 70 minus 20, or 50). The 
matrix and each party's payoffs appear as below164: 
Figure 1: Normal Form Game Between U.S. and  E.U. 
E.U. 
Allow Restrict 
Regulate 
U.S. 
Don't 
Regulate 
164. In each pair of payoffs, the U.S. payoff is listed first, and the E.U. payoff second. 
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A strictly dominant strategy for the United States under this 
model is non-Regulation.l65 Regardless of whether the European 
Union decides to Allow or Restrict, the United States is better off 
choosing not to Regulate (earning a payoff of 70 versus 30 in the event 
of an  Allow strategy by the European Union, and earning a payoff of 
40 versus 10 in the event of a Restrict strategy by the European 
Union). Given the dominance of the Don't Regulate strategy for the 
United States, the European Union, acting rationally, will be forced to 
pursue a Restrict strategy. As the European Union expects the 
United States to choose Don't Regulate, it is better off choosing 
Restrict (and earning 40), rather than Allow (earning 20). 
Although the  game as  set forth above reaches equilibrium, it 
does not necessarily produce an  optimal or even desirable result. The 
United States ends up capturing less value than it otherwise would, 
and processing fewer transactions with E.U. consumers. This is 
obviously a poor result for the United States, but it is also problematic 
for those E.U. consumers who want to transact with U.S. firms. There 
are transactions for which U.S. firms might be better suited, either 
because E.U. firms do not provide the goods/services involved, or 
because U.S. firms can provide the goods/services more cheaply or 
efficiently. The inability of such transactions to be consummated 
represents a loss to the system in the form of potential value left 
uncaptured by anyone. Additionally, there may be some appetite 
among U.S. consumers for some regulation of U.S. firms.166 An 
outcome tha t  essentially means zero regulation by the United States 
of i ts firms is a n  unfavorable one for U.S. consumers. 
Beyond the suboptimality of the result, the model a s  defined so 
far does not quite capture or predict the actual outcome of the game as  
"played" in  the real world. The United States and the European Union 
forged a solution to their data privacy dilemma that  provided not only 
more than the zero regulation regime anticipated by the normal form 
game, but also less than the predicted draconian restrictions on data 
usage.l67 The predictive shortcoming of the normal form game here is 
because it does not adequately capture the structure of the 
relationship between the players. Unlike the motorist and pedestrian 
165. A strictly dominant strategy is one that is always the best choice for a 
particular player, regardless of the strategy chosen by the other player. See BAIRD ET AL., 
supra note 158, a t  11. 
166. The vigorous nature of the debate over privacy issues in the U.S., and the 
advocacy activities of organizations such as  the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Coalition Against Unsolicited Commercial Email, 
provide strong evidence of such a phenomenon. 
167. See discussion supra Part 1I.D regarding the U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Program. 
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often used to illustrate tort applications of the normal form game,l68 
the United States and the European Union do not each make a single 
decision regarding data protection with no idea of what move will be 
the opponent will make. Instead, the players here make a series of 
moves as  part of a n  ongoing, recurring set of trade actions. Rather 
than being simultaneous, a s  in the normal form game, the players' 
interaction is dynamic and iterative. A party may make a move in one 
round of play with an  eye toward the effect of that move on future 
rounds. Each party uses its opponent's early round moves to inform 
strategy for later rounds. Thus, a more robust tool for analyzing the 
U.S.-E.U. data competition is the extensive form game, which provides 
the players an  opportunity to assess and re-calculate strategy over the 
course of repeated interactions. 
The extensive form game models multiple rounds of actions 
taken by the players, the sequence in which actions are taken, and the 
information and options available to the players during each round.169 
Despite its usefulness in iterative interactions, however, it is possible 
to use the extensive form game to model an interaction between the 
United States and the European Union that does little more than 
replicate the results of the normal form game. For example, in the 
Figure 2 below, with the United States moving first, backwards 
induction indicates that  the outcome will be Don't RegulateIRestrict. 
Moving last, and faced with the indicated choices, the European Union 
will choose Restrict over Allow in the event of a decision by the United 
States to Regulate (earning 50 rather than 40, as  in the normal form 
model above), and it will also choose Restrict over Allow in the event 
of a decision by the United States not to Regulate (earning 40 over 20, 
as  in the normal form model above).l70 In determining its first move, 
the United States will take into account that the European Union's 
only rational strategy in the second round is Restrict. Therefore, in 
order to secure a payoff of 40 rather than 10, the United States will 
choose Don't Regulate. 
168. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 
43-46 (3d ed. 2003) (citing generally John Prather Brown, Toward an  Economic Theory of 
Liability, 2 J .  LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973)). 
169. See generally Shubik, supra note 154, at 286-88 (describing the game tree used 
in extensive form game models). 
170. By convention, in each pair of payoffs, the payoff of the first mover (in this case 
the US.) is listed first. 
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Figure 2: Extensive Form Game with U.S. as First Mover 
-- - - 
- 
E.U. Restricts E.U. Allows 
Regulates U.S. Does 
Does Not 
Regulate Regulate 
(10,SO) (40, 401 (30,401 (70,201 
Under the current set of payoffs, the outcome is no different if 
the E.U. is the first mover (see Figure 3 below). Moving last, the U.S. 
will choose Don't Regulate a s  its more lucrative strategy in  the case of 
both possible moves by the E.U.. Don't Regulate nets the U.S. a payoff 
of 70 over 30 in  the event of an  Allow decision, and a payoff of 40 over 
10 if the E.U. has chosen Restrict. Knowing the decision set faced by 
the U.S. in  the last move, the E.U. will choose Restrict in the first 
move, in order to earn 40 rather than 20.171 
171. By convention, in each pair of payoffs, the payoff of the first mover (in this case 
the E.U.) is listed first. 
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Figure 3: Extensive Form Game with E.U. a s  First Mover 
E.U. Restricts 
;:A Does s. Not ~ t / ~ \ ~ ~  U.S. Does 
Regulate Regulate 
(50,lO) (40,401 (40,30) (20,701 
To demonstrate more accurately the impact of iterative play in 
the U.S.-E.U. data protection game, we must make adjustments to the 
model. The revised model introduces a n  additional round of play, with 
the European Union playing first. The European Union chooses 
strategy, the United States follows, and then the European Union 
receives a final play.172 Along with the additional round, there are 
adjustments to the parties' payoffs, due in part to an  additional 
strategy available to the European Union: Halt. 
A number of additional assumptions are necessary in analyzing 
the revised model with the Halt strategy available to the European 
Union. First, adopting the Halt strategy imposes a significant cost on 
the European Union. For purposes of the model, employing the Halt 
strategy means ceasing all data transfers from the European Union to 
the United States. I t  is obvious that such a move would heavily and 
negatively impact U.S. payoffs, but the strategy is not without pain for 
the European Union. The Halt strategy would necessitate more 
rigorous (and expensive) enforcement in order to ensure that  no 
172. I t  should be noted that, although we posit three rounds of play here, the model 
may also be framed as  having up to n rounds, with n being an  odd number. The E.U. 
makes the first and nth moves, and every odd-numbered move in between. 
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personal information is transferred to the United States; such 
enforcement costs can be expected to reduce the net amount of any 
payoff to the European Union from the game. Additionally, 
collaborative opportunities between U.S. firms and E.U. firms would 
be lost almost completely under the Halt strategy. Without the ability 
to share data about customers by transferring data files to U.S. joint 
venture partners, for example, E.U. firms will be less able to 
strategically exploit the value of their information by forming 
marketing alliances across the Atlantic. Finally, some of the data 
controllers seeking to move data from the European Union to the 
United States are E.U. firms, or a t  least E.U. divisions of U.S. firms. 
Such firms or divisions may employ E.U. citizens locally and pay taxes 
to E.U. Member States. Cessation of data flows would impact the 
revenues of these local players, and reduce the wages and taxes that  
they would typically pay in  the European Union. 
Given the costs of the Halt strategy to the European Union, i t  
will not employ the strategy lightly. If during any round the United 
States chooses Regulate a s  its strategy, the European Union can be 
expected not to pursue the  Halt strategy during its turn. If the United 
States chooses Don't Regulate, however, it can expect the European 
Union to choose Halt in the next round, leading to a zero payoff for the 
United States. We also assume that  the cost to Restrict is cumulative; 
if the European Union incurs such cost in multiple rounds, then the 
total cost to Restrict will be a multiple of the base restriction cost of 
10. For example, if the European Union initially Restricts, and then 
Restricts again after the  United States moves, its additional cost to 
Restrict will be 20 rather than the 10 incurred when the Restrict 
strategy is chosen (only once) in the normal form game. Therefore, the 
payoff to the European Union will be reduced by 10, in the event that  
the players pursue a Restrict-Regulate-Restrict chain of strategies. 
Other payoffs are similarly affected by the iterative nature of 
the game, and the particular sequence in which moves play out. If the 
United States Regulates in  response to a Restrict decision by the 
European Union, the  payoff to the United States is reduced by 10. 
This result reflects increased costs caused by the adjustment on the 
part of U.S. businesses to the practical limitations of the E.U. 
restrictions coupled with the  legal burdens of a new U.S. regulatory 
scheme. If the European Union Allows initially, and then Allows 
again following a play by the United States of Regulate, it gains 
incremental revenue (its persistently permissive environment acting 
cumulatively and providing space for more E.U.-involved transactions 
to occur) and sees a +10 change in its payoff over the Allow-Regulate 
pairing of the normal form game. 
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The players' payoffs thus emerge as  follows: If the parties 
pursue Restrict-Regulate-Restrict, the European Union earns 40 and 
the United States earns 10, while if they pursue Restrict-Regulate- 
Allow, the European Union earns 40 and the United States earns 30. 
A choice by the United States not to Regulate following a decision by 
the European Union to Restrict leads to a 30-30 split in payoffs if the 
European Union Restricts again, a payoff of 50 for the European 
Union with a zero payoff for the United States if the European Union 
Halts, and a payoff of E.U. = 20 and U.S. = 70 if the European Union 
Allows on its second turn. If the players pursue Allow-Regulate- 
Restrict, the European Union earns 50 and the United States earns 
10, while if they pursue Allow-Regulate-Allow, the European Union 
earns 50 and the United States earns 30. Meanwhile, a choice by the 
United States not to Regulate following a European Union decision to 
Allow leads to a payoff of E.U. = 40 and U.S. = 30 if the European 
Union Restricts, a payoff of 50 for the European Union with a zero 
payoff for the United States if the European Union Halts, and a payoff 
of E.U. = 20 and U.S. = 70 if the European Union Allows again on its 
second turn. These payoffs are illustrated in Figure 4 below. 
Figure 4: Extended Form Game Including E.U. "Halt" Strategy 
EU Restricts EU Allows 
Regulates 
A 
Does Not u S A 5 : ;  ~ L a t e A  R gulate
EU Restricts AEu AIIOWS rStA EU s Eu Restricts AIIOWS ~ s t r A  
Halts Halts 
(40,lO) (40,30) (30,30) (20,70) (50,101 (50,O) (50,30) (40,301 (5070) (20,70) 
We can predict that the United States will not pursue any 
strategy that  would present the European Union with a 
Restrict/Halt/Allow set of strategy choices. When presented with such 
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a choice, the European Union will always choose Halt, opting to 
receive a payoff of 50 rather than 30 (in the case of a Restrict-Don't 
Regulate-Restrict progression of play), 20 (in the case of either 
Restrict-Don't Regulate-Allow or Allow-Don't Regulate-Allow), or 40 
(Allow-Don't Regulate-Restrict). The only way to avoid the European 
Union's choosing the Halt strategy (and consigning the United States 
to a payoff of 0) is for the United States not to choose Don't Regulate. 
Because the United States will not elect a strategy that presents the 
Halt option to the European Union, the  branches of the tree that  
include a Don't Regulate choice by the United States can effectively be 
removed. Only the Restrict-Regulate-Restrict, Restrict-Regulate- 
Allow, Allow-Regulate-Restrict, and Allow-Regulate-Allow 
progressions are viable. Both progressions that begin with Allow 
provide higher payoffs for the European Union than the progressions 
that begin with Restrict (50 versus 40). Intuitively, this makes sense, 
as the two Allow progressions provide more of an opportunity to avoid 
cumulative enforcement costs associated with the Restrict strategy 
over multiple rounds of play. As between the two remaining outcomes 
that result from a n  Allow-first strategy, the European Union is 
indifferent, as  either will yield a payoff of 50. 
If, after an  Allow-Regulate set of moves by the players, the 
European Union is indifferent between Allow and Restrict, how did 
the players arrive a t  the current state of affairs, Safe Harbor (a 
regime of mild regulation by the United States) and an  Allow choice by 
the European Union? One explanation involves each player 
communicating important information to the other in advance of, or 
even simultaneously with, its actual moves in the game. First, the 
European Union communicates to the United States a credible threat 
to reduce its payoff from data transfers to zero. The framework 
constructed by the E.U. Directive supports this threat by requiring 
Member States to take steps to discontinue the flow of data to states 
not deemed adequate protectors of personal inf0rmation.1~~ In any 
round where such a strategy is available to the European Union, it 
rationally adopts that  strategy because of the opportunity for a 
superior payoff. Knowing this fact, and respecting the threat, the 
United States has a n  incentive to avoid the "Halt" choice presenting 
itself in any given round of play. Thus, the United States is pushed 
toward the adoption of some kind of Regulate strategy. 
Once the United States chooses the Regulate strategy, there is 
still the question of whether the European Union will choose Restrict 
or Allow (each of which offers the same E.U. payoff). The United 
173. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 62,  art. 25. 
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States has an incentive to attempt to induce a n  outcome that produces 
a higher U.S. payoff (Allow, rather than Restrict). One way to do this 
might be to communicate a commitment to protecting personal 
information, such as by making an  a priori promise to Regulate, albeit 
mildly. The European Union might cooperate with such a move by the 
United States (by Allowing rather than Restricting on its second and 
later turns) because the certainty of some regulation by the United 
States is better than the uncertainty of the game without the U.S. 
commitment. It  is also possible that  preserving other aspects of the 
trade relationship between the players is worth choosing a strategy 
that makes the rival better off, especially when it can be done without 
making the mover worse off. By allowing the United States to 
communicate some commitment to privacy and to implement some 
mild form of regulation, Safe Harbor and the Allow-Regulate-Allow 
progression that it represents, a Pareto superior outcome is presented 
to the Allow-Regulate-Restrict progression that  might otherwise 
unfold.174 
So which player has "won," or is winning, this version of the 
data privacy game? The short answer is the United States. Although 
it has been persuaded to adopt a form of a Regulate strategy, such 
regulation is relatively mild. The Safe Harbor regime does not reach 
the level of comprehensiveness of the privacy protection systems in 
European Union nations, and seems to preserve elements of the 
historical American laissez-faire approach. For example, rather than 
U.S. companies being subject to blanket rules, the Safe Harbor regime 
allows a subset of those companies to "opt in" to a privacy-protective 
mode of operation. Arguably, this would be a self-selecting group of 
firms that  consider privacy protection important, and large numbers 
of firms that should be the object of regulation will escape scrutiny. 
The companies set their own specific rules, via their privacy policies, 
although they must align such rules with the Safe Harbor principles. 
Further, members of Safe Harbor largely self-report their progress in 
achieving privacy goals,175 and they have the option to have privacy 
174. See e.g., POSNER, supra note 38, a t  12-13 (explaining that a transaction or 
allocation of resources is Pareto Superior to another if i t  makes a t  least one participant 
better off without making any participant worse off, and that a Pareto optimal state of 
affairs is one where any reallocation of resources would only increase the wealth of one 
party a t  the expense of another). 
175. See U.S .  Department of Commerce, Final Safe Harbor Documents: Frequently 
Asked Question 6, http://export.gov/safeharbor/FAQ6SelfCertFinal.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 
2006). 
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disputes settled p r i ~ a t e 1 y . l ~ ~  Other nations that  have earned the 
"adequate" designation from the European Union have had to create 
much more pervasive and comprehensive systems in order to do ~ 0 . 1 7 7  
The European Union's own assessment of the game illustrates 
the degree to which the United States has been able to implement a 
"Regulate Lite" system. The Commission Staff Working Document on 
the implementation of Safe Harbor (the "E.U. Safe Harbor Report"), 
required by Decision 520/2000/EC,178 reports that, although there has 
been steady growth in the number of Safe Harbor companies, the 
absolute number of companies signed up for the program is still small, 
and the market share represented by such companies has not been 
analyzed.179 Therefore, the actual impact of the program on the 
marketplace may be slight. Further, the privacy performance of 
members of the program has yet to be audited by U.S. regulators, and 
it is unclear a t  best whether any of the members7 privacy policies 
undergo regulatory scrutiny.l80 The E.U. Safe Harbor Report 
expresses concern with the effectiveness of attempts by Safe Harbor 
companies to translate the Safe Harbor principles into written (and 
posted) privacy policies, and proposes a more proactive posture on the 
part of the Department of Commerce and the FTC in policing these 
issues.l81 The issues raised by the E.U. Safe Harbor Report are 
indicative of a regime that  is still functioning in a largely self- 
regulatory manner, with mild government oversight, rather than the 
all-encompassing regulation that could have been. 
The game's outcome is not a pure victory for the United States 
however, nor is it a pure loss for the European Union. Although the 
Commission notes that  there have been no comprehensive audits of 
compliance with Safe Harbor principles, it also notes that i t  has 
176. U.S. Department of Commerce, Final Safe Harbor Documents: Frequently 
Asked Question 11 http://export.gov/safeharborIFAQ11FINAL.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 
2006). 
177. For example, Canada's Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act ("PIPEDA") is broad-based, applying with certain exceptions to "every 
organization in respect of personal information (a) that the organization collects, uses or 
discloses in the course of commercial activities; or (b) is about an  employee of the 
organization. . . ." Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 
S.C., ch. 5 (Can.). PIPEDA imposes specific affirmative obligations on collection, use, 
disclosure, access, notice, and the like. Id. 
178. Decision 520/2000/EC requires the Commission to assess Safe Harbor three 
years after its announcement and evaluate whether the system is providing adequate 
protection. See Implementation of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC, supra note 151, a t  
3. 
179. Id. a t  5. 
180. Id. a t  6. 
181. See id. a t  7-8.  
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received no complaints from data subjects.182 The number of Safe 
Harbor complaints referred to alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") 
organizations such a s  TRUSTe, the Direct Marketing Association, 
BBBOnline, and the American Arbitration Association, has been 
"insignificant," such that  the Commission does not have enough of a 
sample to evaluate fully the privacy decisions of the program's ADR 
providers.183 
I t  may be that, from the perspective of the European data 
subject, U.S. data usage under Safe Harbor has not been 
objectionable, or a t  least not sufficiently objectionable for the harm 
done to outweigh the transaction costs of invoking the complaint 
system. And despite the issues raised in the E.U. Safe Harbor Report, 
the Commission finds that  the U.S. Department of Commerce is 
generally "carrying out i ts role in accordance with the Safe Harbour 
req~irements."l8~ Additionally, there is much anecdotal evidence that  
U.S. firms are becoming more thoughtful about their data protection 
posture and policies. A proliferation of written (and posted) privacy 
policies, the installation of executive level hires with titles like Chief 
Privacy Officer, and the institution by some companies of data privacy 
audits are a few examples of this trend. 185 Even though the result 
here can be counted a s  a U.S. win, it certainly presents an  outcome 
much more favorable to the European Union than that  which would 
result from total U.S. non-cooperation. 
The U.S.-E.U. outcome contains elements of two types of game 
settings recognized in the game theory literature. The data privacy 
competition is related to both cooperation games, where the players 
mutually benefit from cooperating, but  only repeated play discourages 
defection, and coordination games, where "each state's best move 
depends on the move of the other state."la6 The keys to bringing about 
a semblance of a "win-win" outcome, a s  in  many iterative interactions, 
are mutual concern for the future, a n  expectation that  the players will 
encounter each other again, and the capacity for a player to punish 
the other in some future period.lS7 When these keys are present, 
iteration can lead to more cooperative behavior than defecting 
182. Id. at 6 .  
183. Id. at 11. 
184. Id. at 13. 
185. See, e.g., Claudia Rowe, In Business; Keeping it Confidential, N.Y. T I M E S ,  Mar. 
3, 2002, § 14WC, at 3; John Schwartz, The Nation: Surveillance 101; Privacy us. Security on 
Campus, N.Y. T I M E S ,  Aug. 4 ,2002,  $ 4 ,  at 3. 
186. Chinen, supra note 156, at 148-49 (quoting Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, 
A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U .  C H I .  L. REV. 1113 (1999)). 
187. See id. at 167. 
Heinonline - -  9 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 41 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 7  
42 VANDERBILT J. OF ENTERTAINMENT AND TECH. LAW [Vol. 9: 1: 1 
behavior, and to more jointly beneficial outcomes.188 The trade 
relationship between the United States and the European Union 
(especially as regards personal information) fits the classic criteria for 
this sort of result. The volume and connectedness of their mutual 
trade make the two parties extremely important partners to each 
other, and their interactions can be expected to continue into future 
periods without end. Further, the capacity for punishment carries 
particular potency in the data arena, given the pervasiveness and 
importance of data as  both a commodity itself, and as a vital 
component of trade in all other commodities.189 
Game theory also predicts the structural and institutional 
underpinnings of the U.S.-E.U. data privacy result. Where several 
possible equilibriums exist, focal points can be essential to bringing 
about a particular, jointly beneficial one. A focal point is "anything 
that  tends to focus the players' attention on one particular 
equilibrium, in a way that is commonly recognized, tends to make this 
the equilibrium that  the players will expect and thus actually 
implement."lgQ Communication is a means for creating focal points; 
therefore treaties, or similar agreements, can serve as  focal points in 
interactions between states. Cooperative moves that would lead to 
high joint payoffs can be recorded in a n  agreement to inform parties as 
they consider their moves during the life of the agreement and to set a 
minimum behavioral benchmark.191 In  the case of the U.S.-E.U. data 
privacy competition, the E.U. Directive, a s  a n  agreement among the 
E.U. Member States, and the Safe Harbor program (including the 
reporting mechanism of the Working Party), as an agreement between 
the European Union and the United States, serve the focal point 
function by focusing the players on strategy choices, and therefore 
equilibriums, that  involve some level of regulation by the United 
States in order to avoid possible outcomes that might invoke a 
cessation of data flows from the European Union to the United States. 
Establishment of institutions can also engender cooperative 
strategies such as  those employed by the players in the current game. 
Jointly created institutions, such as  Safe Harbor, can be used as a 
method for implementing cooperative strategies. Their joint nature 
increases the likelihood that the players will not only cooperate 
188. See Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the 
Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 MELB. U .  L. REV. 416, 419 (1999) (citing ROBERT 
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984)). 
189. See discussion supra at Part I.A. 
190. Chinen, supra note 156, at 153 (quoting ROGER B. MEYERSON, GAME THEORY: 
ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 371 (1991)). 
191. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 186, at 1171. 
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initially, but will cooperate in a continued manner over time.lg2 Like 
agreements, institutions can also serve to minimize uncertainty and 
transaction costs associated with dynamic playing environments.193 
Where the underlying assumptions and setting are subject to 
evolution, institutions can be used to adjust payoffs and commitments 
in a n  orderly and mutually beneficial manner, with minimal harm to 
the relationship between the players.lg4 Given the dynamic nature of 
the U.S.-E.U. data collection and usage environment, and the vital 
nature of the trade, creation of institutions such as Safe Harbor is 
entirely predictable based on a careful application of game theory 
concepts in this space. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
What is the future of the U.S.-E.U. data privacy game? Have 
the players reached a n  equilibrium that  is stable in addition to being 
mutually beneficial? What changes can be expected in the 
relationship between the players, and in their views regarding the 
strategies available to them in the ongoing competition? How will the 
parties seek either to seize further advantage, or to protect gains 
under the current equilibrium? Of course, none of the answers to the 
above questions can be predicted with certainty, but the play of the 
game thus far and the levers used by the parties to arrive a t  the 
current state of the world provide some guidance. The parties have 
used communication and institutions to create focal points and reduce 
uncertainty. Communication of a credible threat to halt data flows, 
and the existence of a supranational institution to facilitate carrying 
out the threat, led to the adoption of a mild form of regulation by the 
United States, rather than no regulation a t  all. The Safe Harbor 
program itself represents a n  institution that sets baseline 
expectations for acceptable strategy choices in the ongoing game, and 
also provides communication opportunities. 
The European Union continues to signal, via the E.U. Safe 
Harbor Report, that certain U.S. strategy choices (more proactive 
oversight, audits of Safe Harbor companies by regulators, analysis of 
Website privacy policies) are more conducive to continuation of the 
mutually favorable current equilibrium than others. The European 
Union also continues to signal that  "the E.U. panel and data 
protection authorities should invite organizations that subscribe to the 
192. Frischmann, supra note 156, at 719. 
193. Id. at 683. 
194. Id. 
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Principles to effectively comply with the Principles and use their 
power to suspend data flows if they conclude that there is a 
substantial likelihood that  the Principles are being violated."195 
Cessation of data flows is still an  option, and both players understand 
that. The institutional anchors and communication devices that have 
been put in place in this game can be expected to preserve the core 
gains (to the European Union as  a player, to the United States as a 
player, and to their respective data subjects) of the current 
equilibrium, while slowly introducing more substance to the "Regulate 
Lite" strategy. The individual European citizen will not be completely 
let alone, but her data privacy rights with respect to United States 
actors will certainly exceed zero. 
195. Implementation of Commission Decision 520/2000/EC, supra note 151, at 8 .  
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